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SEEKING A COMMON GROUND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin*
I have been invited to address several bar association meetings in Chicago,
usually on the topic of professional ethics.' On these occasions and from
personal encounters with attorneys, I have learned that many of them
hunger for truth, justice, and mercy. Many choose to labor in the profession
of law because they desire to serve people. I identify strongly with their
hunger and desire; the legal profession and the Church share many mutual
concerns .2
We also share a common concern about human rights. The Church
approaches human rights from a long tradition based on the religious
concept of natural law. The approach of legal philosophers to human rights
is rooted instead in the relationship of the individual to society. Although
we may address the same question from different perspectives, we find
broad areas of agreement, because we ultimately are concerned with the
nature and rights of the human person, the protection of those rights, and
their relationship to the rights of others in society.
Nevertheless, because we approach this question in different ways, we
sometimes find it difficult to communicate. We may use the same words
with slightly different connotations, or we may use different words to
express the same reality. We need a common ground, a mutually agreed
upon language, that will enable us to communicate more effectively.
Recently, I have become familiar with the work of Ronald Dworkin,
professor of jurisprudence at Oxford University in England. He provides
a legal analysis that may help locate such a common ground. I will explore
the potential of Dworkin's work in this article, which is not intended to
be a scholarly analysis or critique of his legal philosophy. I will highlight
certain of his ideas and indicate how they might enable us to come to a
clearer understanding of human rights. Let me acknowledge at the outset
that many attorneys and judges may, at first, find Dworkin's legal philos-
Cardinal Bernardin is the archbishop of Chicago.
I am honored that the editors of the DePaul Law Review have invited me, a pastor with
no professional training in the law, to contribute an article to this journal. On several occasions
in recent years I have addressed such topics as religion and politics as well as the relationship
of Church and State. The DePaul Law Review published one of these addresses through the
Center for Church/State Studies. See Bernardin, Marty & Adams, The Role of the Religious
Leader in the Development of Public Policy, 34 DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (1984).
1. I was invited to address the Chicago Bar Association on Jan. 30, 1986. On June 18,
1986, I addressed the Federal Bar Association. Many of the ideas expressed in this article were
developed in these addtesses.
2. In 1934, the Archdiocese of Chicago established the Catholic Lawyers Guild of
Chicago, a permanent forum for Roman Catholic lawyers to share common concerns.
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ophy and the Church's understanding of natural law rather foreign to their
way of thinking and unrelated to the way they practice and interpret the
law. I hope to persuade them to reconsider their opinion.
On January 30, 1986, I had the privilege of addressing the Chicago Bar
Association. I was asked to speak on the crisis in morality and morale that
followed in the wake of "Operation Greylord." 3 On that occasion, and
again on June 18, 1986, in an address to the Federal Bar Association, I
quoted Charles Evans Hughes to highlight the importance of the legal
profession: "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what
the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and
of our property under the Constitution.'"
Many attorneys and judges would probably accept Chief Justice Hughes'
words as both descriptive of legal practice and normative of our consti-
tutional system. However, I have recently become convinced that his words
are neither wholly accurate nor particularly helpful in describing our fun-
damental law. There must be more to the Constitution and, particularly,
the Bill of Rights than simply "what the judges say it is." Otherwise, we
are subject to judicial tyranny, and the law is disconnected from the notion
of justice.
In my address before the Chicago Bar Association, I also referred to the
work of Ronald Dworkin, without adverting to the inconsistency between
his views and those that necessarily follow from Hughes' description of
the Constitution.' I have since learned that Dworkin's scholarly studies
have been collected and published in two volumes, Taking Rights Seriously6
and A Matter of Principle." I have found that his ideas have much in
common with the natural law theory which I espouse. His jurisprudence
is especially valuable because it puts forth a credible rights thesis.
In A Matter of Principle, Dworkin offers the premise that two dominant
themes in twentieth-century jurisprudence have distorted the concept of
law: legal positivism and utilitarianism. Legal positivism asserts that the
only existing rights and duties are those explicit in positive law-that is,
legislative statutes or past judicial decisions. This assumes that law exists
only because of human action. Utilitarian theories go further. They argue
that what is good for society is the foundation of law-in other words,
whatever constitutes the greatest good for the greatest number should
dictate what laws exist. These views stand in contradistinction to an un-
derstanding of law as being grounded in, expressive of, and judged by
3. "Operation Greylord" is an ongoing federal investigation of corruption in the Cook
County courts. See e.g., Chicago Tribune, Mar. 16, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
4. Speech by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, May 3, 1907, quoted in R. ALDISERT,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 501 (1976).
5. A narrow interpretation of Chief Justice Hughes's description leads to a blatant form
of legal positivism in which law is nothing other than "what the judges say it is."
6. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
7. R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
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rights and principles that exist prior to and apart from written law, and
that serve as parameters for the ordering of the proper relationship between
the individual and society.
In retrospect, it is easy to see the difference between the concept of law
as an expression of a higher natural law and the blatant legal positivism
of Hughes's interpretation of the Constitution. If the Constitution is the
equivalent to what the judges say it is, then we are at the mercy of their
discretion, and rights mean nothing. Dworkin's work, as I understand it,
stands primarily for two things: (1) the primacy of individual human rights,
and (2) the reality of principles that provide a moral context for interpreting
the Constitution and adjudicating "hard cases." His jurisprudence also
opposes all forms of positivism and utilitarianism as adequate justifications
for law.
I. THE PRIMACY OF RIGHTS
Belief in the primacy and, therefore, the reality of human rights entails
denial of the central tenets of both legal positivism and utilitarianism. By
definition, rights make legal sense to the legal positivist only to the extent
that they are created and enforced by positive law. While not denying that
the law may create rights by way of legislation, Dworkin holds, with the
tradition of natural law theory, that individuals possess certain rights by
virtue of their existence as human beings. In fundamental ways each human
person possesses inalienable rights that the state must respect. This is the
concept Dworkin has in mind when he asks us to take rights seriously.8
In its political expression, utilitarianism takes seriously the good of the
majority. Naturally, one would expect the good of the majority to be
discovered by consulting the opinion and will of the majority. This method
appears to be fundamentally fair and a basis for democracy. However,
most cannot resist the further step of making the good of the majority, as
determined by the majority, decisive for all cases. In the name of the
majority rule, utility ignores the individual, rights are not taken seriously,
and law is nothing more than the possibility of tyranny by the party in
power.
In rejecting both legal positivism and utilitarianism, Dworkin places
moral limits on the state's pow6r and includes in the definition of the rule
of law the belief that the state and the government are, in some important
ways, servants of the individual. A proper constitution admits the existence
of certain rights and recognizes an obligation on the part of the government
to defend them. The Constitution is neither the source of these rights, nor
the definitive articulation of what they are in particular circumstances. 9
8. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 6, at 184-205.
9. As Dworkin noted, "[Tihough the constitutional system adds something to the
protection of moral rights against the Government, it falls far short of guaranteeing these
rights, or even establishing what they are." Id. at 186.
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Beyond the written words of the Constitution is the principle of the
constitutional state.10
II. THE REALTY OF PRINCIPLES
An important aspect of Dworkin's jurisprudence is the matter of prin-
ciples. Commitment to the place and function of principles within the
concept of law corrects the prevailing view of the law as a mere collection
of rules."i Rules of law, whether articulated through the development of
common law or the direct product of legislative action, are generally
justified by policy. Rules articulate a decision that the general welfare or
the public good will be served by general application of a standard that
requires, permits, or forbids certain conduct or results. The model rule
would be an act of legislation, applicable only to future circumstances and
the facts pertaining to the subject under consideration. Where rules of law
exist, they typically determine the outcome of the cases to which they
apply. Rules articulate the desire of the legislative will, and from that
desire they have their authority and force.
Principles fill in where rules do not apply. Situations not covered by an
existing rule still exist, and courts need to provide some rationale for their
decisions. Dworkin defines "principle" as a rationale: "I call a 'principle'
a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is
a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality. ' 12
Principles form the basis for a decision even where no rule defines the
decision. The adjudication of so-called "hard cases" provides the setting
in which principles govern the outcome of cases.' 3
According to Dworkin, principles operate at the heart of the legal system.
Of particular importance are such concepts as liberty, fairness, and equality,
concepts constitutionalized in the equal protection and due process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment-the grounds of the American political ex-
periment. These are moral concepts, and they are meant to function as
moral principles. Nevertheless, there is no consensus regarding all they
entail or how they are to be applied. For Dworkin, these principles are the
vehicle by which individuals can argue for the existence of rights not
specifically legislated, not found to be recognized by any rule of law.
10. Most people may think of constitutional law solely in reference to the document itself
and its subsequent interpretation by the courts. In the United Kingdom, however, the term
presupposes not only notions of empowering and legitimating government, but also the rec-
ognition that government is limited-limited precisely because individuals have rights. This is
certainly the Roman Catholic Church's vision of a constitution found in Dignitatis Humanae,
the Declaration on Religious Freedom promulgated at the Second Vatican Council in 1965.
11. See, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
12. R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 22.
13. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 81-130.
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EQUALITY
Dworkin devotes a chapter of Taking Rights Seriously to "Justice and
Rights."'1 4 There he develops the idea of the "original position" first
expressed in John Rawls's A Theory of Justice."5 Behind the "original
position," Dworkin sees what he calls "the theory" that entails an explicit
recognition that rights are natural. This deep theory, he insists, is based
on rights, and he explains it this way:
It must be a theory that is based on the concepts of rights that are
natural, in the sense that they are not the product of any legislation, or
convention, or hypothetical contract. I have avoided that phrase because
it has, for many people, disqualifying metaphysical associations. They
think that natural rights are supposed to be special attributes worn by
primitive men like amulets, which they carry into civilization to ward
off tyranny. 16
Dworkin endorses this theory behind Rawls's "original position," but in
the endorsement he makes it clear that he is not accepting a "metaphysically
ambitious" understanding of natural law.17 For those intent on providing
an ontological foundation for the existence of rights, Dworkin's work will
not be satisfying. His formulation of the Rights Thesis remains a construc-
tive model.
I understand Dworkin's natural rights theory as an assumption that pulls
together the various components within the political/legal systems of liberal
democracies. The philosophy here is more intuitive than rational, more
phenomenological than metaphysical." Assumption of this idea of natural
rights, this non-theological and non-metaphysical construct of the natural
law theory, allows productive dialogue between adherents of religious
beliefs and those with a secular stance.' 9 This is most evident in Dworkin's
development, through Rawls, of the right to equality as fundamental.
As I made clear in the address previously published in this journal, the
most fundamental element in Catholic social doctrine concerns the principle
of the dignity and worth of every individual: Human life is sacred. 20 I also
indicated my belief that human dignity is the basis for the development of
14. Id. at 150-83.
15. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
16. R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 176 (emphasis in original).
17. See id. at 176-77.
18. See Stake, Book Review, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 570 (1978).
19. "There is a legitimate secularity of the political process, and there is a legitimate role
for religious and moral discourse in our nation's life. The dialogue which keeps both alive
must be a careful conversation which seeks neither to transform secularity into secularism nor
to change the religious role into religiously dominated public discourse." Joseph Cardinal
Bernardin, Address to Woodstock Forum, Georgetown University, Oct. 25, 1984, published in
14 ORIGINS 321, 323 (1984).
20. See Bernardin, Marty & Adams, The Role of the Religious Leader in the Development
of Public Policy, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).
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public policy.21 Dworkin seemingly would agree with this belief, but he
discusses it more specifically in terms of equality,2 2 indeed a particularly
fundamental conception of equality: "Individuals have a right to equal
concern and respect in the design and administration of the political
institutions that govern them." 23 At the most basic level, individual women
and men have the right to treatment as equals. All other claims to rights
or entitlements can be derived from this right, including claims to equal
treatment. Although these other claims may be secondary, they are often
put forward as more important than treatment as equals. 24
Under Dworkin's jurisprudence the fundamental concepts of our political
morality are implied in the Constitution. Particular clauses of the Consti-
tution, such as the equal protection clause, the due process clauses, or the
eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment are derived
from moral principles. These clauses are not "vague" attempts to constrain
interpretations of the Constitution within limits defined by some notion of
the framer's intent. Rather, they are "appeals to moral concepts ' 25 that
require lawyers and judges to squarely face issues of moral principle when
they frame arguments and decide cases. Dworkin views these appeals as
articulating the most compelling conceptions of moral concepts. Equal
concern and respect-the fundamental conception of equality derived from
Rawls's theory, and the root from which all other rights are derived-are
the very rights protected by the equal protection clause. 26
I do not know how seriously Dworkin's work is taken within the legal
profession. Nor am I aware of any success his work may have had in
influencing the teaching of law or the argument of cases. It is possible that
most lawyers have not been exposed to his thought, or that those who
have may reject it as contrary to the reigning belief that law and morality
should not be so closely connected. Nevertheless, Dworkin's own work
indicates that he seeks to overcome a long and counterproductive commit-
ment of the legal profession to the schools of positivism and utilitarianism,
both of which strive to be value-free. I would like to encourage attorneys
to find common cause with what the ordinary citizen understands to be
the case: that the law and the Constitution are, or should be, reflections
of values that are shared in our society and have been handed in trust by
generations who espoused them before us.
Dworkin's work is a major contribution to this endeavor precisely because
it avoids allegiance to theological and metaphysical concepts that do not
21. Id.
22. R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 184, 198-99.
23. Id. at 180.
24. The point is made clear in the general moral example involving two persons suffering
from the same disease when there is only one dosage of treatment available. Equal concern
and respect requires that the dosage be given to the individual who is dying rather than to the
one who is only uncomfortable. Id. at 227.
25. Id. at 136.
26. Id. at 229.
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serve the varying convictions of our pluralistic society. At the same time,
his writings are not antagonistic to the tradition of natural law that he
expresses in secular terms. I am in agreement with Dworkin's argument in
his essay on judicial review:
Learned Hand warned us that we should not be ruled by philosopher-
judges even if our judges were better philosophers. But that threat is
and will continue to be a piece of hyperbole. We have reached a balance
in which the Court plays a role in government but not, by any stretch,
the major role. Academic lawyers do no service by trying to disguise the
political decisions this balance assigns to judges. Rule by academic priests
guarding the myth of some canonical original intention is no better than
the rule by Platonic guardians in different robes. We do better to work,
openly and willingly, so that the national argument of principle that
judicial review provides is better argument for our part. We have an
institution that calls some issues from the battleground of power politics
to the forum of principle. It holds out the promise that the deepest,
most fundamental conflicts between individual and society will once,
someplace, finally, become questions of justice. I do not call that religion
or prophecy. I call it law.,,
Perhaps the most fitting tribute lawyers can make during this Bicentennial
of the Constitution is to urge a recommitment of the law schools to the
serious teaching of fundamental jurisprudence. Its subject matter is con-
stitutional law in its widest scope; but it is rarely a required course. I am
not aware of its having been a subject for bar examinations in this country
in recent times.
Dworkin demonstrates that law is much more than the mechanical ap-
plication of rules and the search for legislative intent. Law is, in some
important ways, the vehicle for the decision of important questions of
politics and moral principle. This is especially true for constitutional law,
that domain in which our rights are recognized and, hopefully, protected.
Yet, here is where we have been the most deficient. Rights have either been
ignored or erroneously articulated due to incomplete attention to the moral
component of recent cases. 21 We also need to give serious attention to the
question of what, if any, rights we might admit in the economic sphere,
and whether that can be done without harm to our political rights. All of
these issues are fundamentally philosophical problems, and Dworkin's work
implies that lawyers must be philosophers.
29
27. R. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 71.
28. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 223-39. See generally, R. DWORKIN, supra note
6, at 293-315 ("reverse discrimination" cases in which Dworkin believes that incomplete attention
was paid to the moral component).
29. "There is no need for lawyers to play a passive role in the development of a theory
of moral rights against the state, however, any more than they have been passive in the
development of legal sociology and legal economics. They must recognize that law is no more
independent from philosophy than it is from these other disciplines." R. DwoRKIN, supra note 6,
at 149.
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